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Abstract—Nowadays, autonomous driving has attracted much
attention from both industry and academia. Convolutional neural
network (CNN) is a key component in autonomous driving,
which is also increasingly adopted in pervasive computing such
as smartphones, wearable devices, and IoT networks. Prior work
shows CNN-based classification models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks. However, it is uncertain to what extent regression
models such as driving models are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, the effectiveness of existing defense techniques, and the
defense implications for system and middleware builders.
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of five adversarial
attacks and four defense methods on three driving models.
Experiments show that, similar to classification models, these
models are still highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This
poses a big security threat to autonomous driving and thus should
be taken into account in practice. While these defense methods
can effectively defend against different attacks, none of them are
able to provide adequate protection against all five attacks. We
derive several implications for system and middleware builders:
(1) when adding a defense component against adversarial attacks,
it is important to deploy multiple defense methods in tandem
to achieve a good coverage of various attacks, (2) a black-
box attack is much less effective compared with a white-box
attack, implying that it is important to keep model details (e.g.,
model architecture, hyperparameters) confidential via model
obfuscation, and (3) driving models with a complex architecture
are preferred if computing resources permit as they are more
resilient to adversarial attacks than simple models.
Index Terms—Autonomous driving, adversarial attack, defense
I. INTRODUCTION
Many pervasive computing applications now use regression
neural network models. For instance, a CNN-based regression
model is capable of predicting the distance to collision for
unmanned aerial vehicles to accomplish collision-free navi-
gation. A stacked autoencoder regression model is deployed
at the edge of simulated sensor networks to predict values
of QoS metrics (response time and throughput) for each
service [41]. In this paper, we focus on autonomous driving,
which extensively uses CNN-based regression models.
Nowadays, technology companies such as Tesla, Uber,
and Waymo have made a huge investment in autonomous
vehicles. Waymo recently launched the first self-driving car
service in Phoenix, making one of the first steps towards
commercializing autonomous vehicles [5]. In an autonomous
driving system, cameras and LiDARs are deployed to collect
information about the driving scene, which is then fed into a
CNN-based driving model to make decisions such as adjusting
the speed and steering angle.
Unfortunately, CNNs can be easily fooled by adversarial
examples, which are constructed by applying small, pixel-level
perturbations to input images [7], [36]. Despite imperceptible
to human eyes, such adversarial examples cause CNNs to
make completely wrong decisions. Recently, Tencent Keen
Security Lab demonstrated an adversarial attack on Tesla
Autopilot by generating adversarial examples to turn on rain
wipers when there is no rain [18].
Many adversarial attacks have been proposed and demon-
strated effective on image classification models [3], [24], [32],
[36], [43]. To defend adversarial attacks, several techniques
have been proposed to harden neural networks [7], [12],
[30], [42]. However, previous research mainly focuses on
image classification models. It is unclear to what extent these
adversarial attacks and defenses are effective on regression
models (e.g., autonomous driving models). This uncertainty
exposes potential security risks and raises research oppor-
tunities. If adversarial attacks could be successfully applied
to autonomous driving systems, attackers could easily cause
traffic accidents and jeopardize personal safety. If existing
defense methods cannot be adapted to defend against attacks
on regression models, it is imperative to identity a novel
defense mechanism suitable for autonomous driving.
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of five ad-
versarial attack methods and four defense methods on au-
tonomous driving models. By conducting systematic exper-
iments on three driving models, we find that except IT-
FGSM [16] (36% attack success rate), all other attacks,
including Opt [36], Opt uni [23], AdvGAN [32], and Adv-
GAN uni [32]), could effectively generate adversarial exam-
ples with an average of 98% success rate in the white-box
setting. Therefore, similar to classification models, CNN-based
regression models are also highly vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. On the other hand, the attack success rate of all attack
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methods is significantly lower in the black-box setting (4%
only on average). This implies that, if neural network archi-
tecture and hyperparameters are not known, a driving model is
much less vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Therefore, in prac-
tice, systems and middleware builders should keep their neural
networks confidential. It may also be beneficial to apply model
obfuscation or model privacy protection techniques [14], [38].
In terms of defense, none of the four defense methods
can effectively detect all five kinds of attacks. Adversarial
training [7] and defensive distillation [30] are only effective
to reduce the success rate of two attacks: IT-FGSM and an
optimization based approach. A method that detects abnormal
hardware state (e.g., GPU memory usage, GPU utilization rate)
can effectively detect these two attacks and to some extent
detect AdvGan. Feature squeezing [44], on the other hand,
can detect all five attacks with more than 78% recall under
a specific setting but with a high false positive rate up to
40%. This indicates that, when building a defense component
in a system or middleware, it is necessary to deploy multiple
defense methods in tandem to be robust to various attacks.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Implementation. We replicate five adversarial attack
methods and four defense techniques with proper adap-
tations to cater to regression-based driving models. We
release our implementations, models, and datasets for
future research and validation.1
• Evaluation. We comprehensively experiment with five
adversarial attacks and four defenses and summarize
results from experiments.
• Implications. We propose three system building impli-
cations for future research in adversarial attacks and
defenses on autonomous driving models.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Autonomous Driving Model
Figure 1 shows the overview of an autonomous driving
model. Given input data from sensors (e.g., LiDARs and cam-
eras), a deep neural network predicts the control of the vehicle
such as the steering angle and speed. CNN is the mainstream
neural network architecture for autonomous driving, since it
has excellent performance, requiring less neurons and consum-
ing less resources. In autonomous vehicles, such driving model
is usually included inside a perception domain controller,
which can be updated remotely through the vehicle’s gateway
[21], [31]. Some companies have published their research on
autonomous driving. For example, comma.ai presents a CNN
based driving model to predict the steering angle based on
driving video [34]. Nvidia builds a CNN model called DAVE-
2 [2]. They demonstrate that DAVE-2 can automatically drive
a vehicle without human intervention 90% of the time in a
simulation test while performing autonomous steering 98% of
time in an on-road test.
1Our dataset and models are available at https://github.com/ITSEG-MQ/
Adv-attack-and-defense-on-driving-model
Fig. 1. The overview of an autonomous driving model [37]
B. Adversarial Attacks
By adding small perturbations to original images, adversar-
ial attacks can deceive a target model to produce completely
wrong predictions. Currently, adversarial attacks are mainly
researched on image classification tasks. Given a target model
f and an original image x ∈ X with its class c, an adversarial
attack constructs an imperceptible adversarial perturbation δ to
form an adversarial example x′ = x +  and make the target
model classify x′ as c′ that is different from c.
Depending on the information required to perform the
attack, existing adversarial attacks can be categorized into
white-box attacks and black-box attacks. White-box attacks
require all details of a target model to perform the attack,
including the training data, the neural network architecture,
parameters, and hyper-parameters, as well as the privilege to
gather the gradients and prediction results of a model [46]. By
contrast, black-box attacks only require to query the model
with arbitrary input data and get the prediction result [29].
Based on the inputs and outputs from the target model, to
perform a black-box attack, attackers can build a substitute
model and achieve white-box attacks on their own model. The
adversarial examples on the substitute model could then be
used to attack the target black-box model, which is called the
transferability of adversarial examples.
C. Adversarial Defenses
Several techniques have been proposed to defend adversar-
ial attacks, which can be roughly categorized as proactive
defenses and reactive defenses. Proactive defenses aim to
improve the robustness of a neural network against adversarial
examples. The common method is to retrain the model using a
dataset with adversarial examples [7], or to add regularization
components to the target model [45]. Furthermore, Papernot et
al. introduced defensive distillation. It increases the magnitude
of inputs to the Softmax layer by adjusting a parameter T
called Temperature to harden a neural network [30]. Reactive
methods, on the other hand, aim to detect adversarial exam-
ples. DNN could be used to determine whether the model is
under attack, by verifying the properties of input images [49]
or by detecting the status of the Softmax layer [19].
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Driving Models
For an image classification model, an adversarial attack is
considered successful if an adversarial image is classified as
a different class compared with the original image. However,
autonomous driving models are regression models that predict
continuous values. Therefore, adversarial attacks on driving
models are defined with respect to an acceptable error range,
known as adversarial threshold. Hence, an adversarial attack
on a driving model is considered successful if the deviation
between the original prediction and the prediction of an
adversarial example is above the adversarial threshold.
Current adversarial attacks on classification model could
be categorized into three classes based on the perturbation
generation method. Fast Gradient Sign based method [7]
directly generates adversarial examples by adding the sign
of the loss gradient with respect to each pixel on original
images. Optimization-based method [36] formulates the ad-
versarial example construction as an optimization problem.
Generative model based method [32] proposes to generate
adversarial examples by harnessing the power of generative
models such as Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [6]
and autoencoder networks [1]. In addition, there is a special
attack named universal attack [23], which generates a single
adversarial example to fail all samples in the dataset.
In this study, we re-implement five adversarial attacks to
form a comprehensive set of adversarial attacks on regression
models. We first choose two classic adversarial attacks: Iter-
ative Targeted Fast Gradient Sign Method (IT-FGSM) [16],
[17], a variant of the classic method Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [7], and an optimization-based approach [36]
as it is the first approach to generate adversarial examples.
We then choose a state-of-the-art generative model based
attack called AdvGAN [32]. Furthermore, we implement two
universal attack methods to increase the diversity of attacks
in our experiments. We do not choose attack methods such as
C&W attack [3] and DeepFool [24], since these attacks rely on
the attributes of classification models (e.g. decision boundary
and the Softmax function). Thus, they cannot be adapted to
regression models. We elaborate on the five selected attack
methods below.
1) Iterative Targeted Fast Gradient Sign Method (IT-
FGSM): IT-FGSM [16], [17] is a variant of Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) that simply adds the sign of the loss
gradient with respect to each pixel on original images. IT-
FGSM applies the targeted FGSM multiple times to get a more
powerful adversarial example.
2) Optimization Based Approach (Opt): This approach cal-
culates an adversarial perturbation  for classification models
by solving the optimization problem as in Formula (1) [36].
argmin

||||2 s.t. f(x+ ) = c′, x+  ∈ [0, 1]m (1)
For regression models, we change c′ to f(x)+∆ and adapt
Formula (1) to Formula (2) and apply the Adam optimizer [15]
to solve the optimization problem.
argmin

||||2 + Jθ(Clip(x+ ), f(x) + ∆) (2)
3) AdvGAN: AdvGAN generates an adversarial example
G(x) from an original image by integrating another objec-
tive Ly = Jθ(G(x), f(x) + ∆) into the objective function
LAdvGAN = Ly + αLGAN , where α sets the importance of
each objective. After training, the generator G could generate
an adversarial example x′ that is similar to an original image
but make an prediction f(x′) that deviates ∆ from f(x).
4) Universal Adversarial Perturbation (Opt uni): We im-
plement this attack based on the optimization based approach.
We first generate a perturbation v on one image. Then for
each image in the dataset, we calculate the minimal change
∆v and adapt v to v + δv. When iterating the whole dataset,
an universal perturbation is obtained.
5) AdvGAN Universal Adversarial Perturbation (Adv-
GAN uni): Poursaeed et al. proposed to use GAN to generate
universal adversarial perturbations [32]. Instead of using the
generator to construct an unique perturbation (G(x)) for each
input image, the generator outputs a universal adversarial
perturbation. In this study, we implement this approach based
on the AdvGAN architecture.
B. Adversarial Defenses on Autonomous Driving Models
While there is a proliferation of defense methods against
adversarial attacks, many of them are designed for image
classification tasks only and thus are not applicable to re-
gression based autonomous driving models. For example, the
adversarial transformation method [8] reduces an adversarial
attack success rate by randomly clipping and rotating input
images. Rotating input images may not impact an image clas-
sification model. But for a regression driving model, rotating
input images will cause a big prediction error. Adversarial de-
noiser [13] also has the same problem, since it has to apply
transformations on input images. Therefore, there is a need
for reevaluating and designing defense methods for regression
models and adapting them to autonomous driving.
In this paper, we adapt and re-implement four defense
methods for autonomous driving. First, we choose two classic
proactive defense methods, adversarial training [7] and de-
fensive distillation [30]. Then we develop a reactive defense
method based on the insight that real-time adversarial example
generation may lead to a resource usage spike in autonomous
vehicles. This method performs runtime monitoring in au-
tonomous vehicles and detects anomalous hardware usage
rates. Finally, we choose another state-of-the-art adversarial
attack detection method called feature squeezing [44], since it
does not need an auxiliary model and achieves good perfor-
mance on classification models.
1) Adversarial Training: By retraining the original model
with adversarial examples, the new model learns features
of adversarial examples and thus has better generalization
and robustness. In this study, we add adversarial examples
generated by proposed attacks to train a new model.
2) Defensive Distillation: Defensive distillation [30] uses
class probabilities predicted by the original model as soft
labels to train a new model. We adapt the original defensive
distillation approach to handle regression models based on the
finding by Hinton et al. [11]. They show that the output of
a neural network hidden layer contains highly encoded infor-
mation that can be leveraged for model distillation. Similarly,
the output of fully connected layers can be used to perform
defensive distillation on CNN based driving models. We
observe that for inputs xi that have similar outputs f(xi), there
are indeed uncorrelated features in the last fully connected
layer outputs zdi , which can provide additional information to
distill and train a new model g. While training the distilled
model, we add a regularizer to distill the information from the
original model as shown in Formula (3). In this way, we use
information from both the output f(x) and the tensors zd to
train the distilled model in order to enhance its generalization
and robustness against adversarial attacks.
L = Σn1 (λ(||zdi − z′id||) + ||f(xi)− g(xi)||)/n (3)
3) Anomaly Detection: Autonomous vehicles are usually
equipped with a runtime monitoring system to check the
vehicle state [40], [48]. First, we monitor model prediction la-
tency caused by adversarial attacks. Second, since autonomous
vehicles are resource constrained, we monitor any spikes in
GPU memory usage and GPU utilization rate via Nvidia Sys-
tem Management Interface (Nvidia-smi) to detect additional
computation caused by adversarial attacks. We evaluate the
effectiveness of this anomaly detection approach by comparing
the prediction time per image and GPU usage with and without
adversarial attacks and further investigate its effectiveness on
different kinds of attack methods.
4) Feature squeezing: Xu et al. [44] proposed two feature
squeezing methods for adversarial defense. The first method
squeezes the original 24-bit color down to 1 bit to 8 bit color.
By doing so, adversarial noise becomes more perceptible as the
bit depth decreases. The second method adopts median spatial
smoothing, which moves a filter move across an original image
and modifies the center pixel value to the median of the pixel
values in the filter. If the difference between the prediction
result of the original image and the prediction result of a
squeezed image by either of the two methods exceeds a pre-
defined threshold T , then the given input is likely to be an
adversarial example.
IV. EXPERIMENT
Dataset. We use the Udacity dataset [39] to train three au-
tonomous driving models and generate adversarial examples.
This dataset contains real-world road images collected by a
front camera installed in a vehicle and the dataset is splited
to training set and testing set by Udacity. The training set
contains 33805 frames and the test set contains 5614 frames.
The steering angle of each frame is normalized from a degree
to a value range between −1 and 1.
Autonomous driving models. We implement and train three
driving models, Epoch [4], Nvidia DAVE-2 [2], and VGG16
TABLE I
THREE AUTONOMOUS DRIVING MODELS FOR EXPERIMENT
Model Parameters# Size(MB) RMSE
Epoch 33, 649, 729 147.82 0.0962
Nvidia 6, 288, 765 26.76 0.1055
VGG16 68, 246, 337 332.29 0.0906
[35] using Pytorch. We choose Epoch because it performs
well in the Udacity Challenge [39]. Nvidia DAVE-2 is a
well known, publicly autonomous driving model. VGG16
adopts a highly robust neural network architecture that is
widely used in transfer learning for image classification. We
adapt VGG16 to a regression driving model by replacing
its last layer with a three-layer feed-forward network. For
these driving models, we uniformly set their input image size
as 128 ∗ 128. The details of those models are demonstrated
in Table I. The error rate of these models is measured by
Root Mean Square Error, as shown in column RMSE. On
the test dataset, if an autonomous driving model by default
predicts 0 for all frames, the RMSE between the predictions
and the ground truth is 0.20678. The RMSE of our adapted
VGG16, Epoch and Nvidia DAVE-2 are 0.0906, 0.0962 and
0.1055 respectively. These models would be ranked 6th to
8th in the Udacity leaderboard, implying that they are fairly
accurate on the Udacity test set. The driving models with
higher rankings are all based on more complicated neural
network architectures (e.g., CNN+RNN), which might be less
susceptible to adversarial attacks and we plan to investigate in
future work.
Adversarial attack and defense settings All attacks and
defenses are implemented in Pytorch. We set the adversarial
threshold ∆ to 0.3. In other words, we consider the attack
successful if the difference between the steer angle prediction
on an adversarial example and the original prediction is greater
than 0.3. Figure 2 shows the impact of threshold on attack
success rate. With the increase of the threshold, the limitation
on the attack success rate becomes strict, and the attack suc-
cess rate drops down. When the threshold is less than 0.3, the
success rate of the universal perturbation attack and AdvGAN
attack keeps steady. When the threshold reaches to 0.3, the
success rate of all five attack methods starts to decrease. And
according to Figure 3, steering angle deviation achieving 0.3
could cause a significant cumulative displacement. Thus, 0.3
is selected as the threshold in this study, and the threshold
could be adjusted according to actual needs in the real-world
implement.
For Iterative Targeted Fast Gradient Sign Method (IT-
FGSM), we set the perturbation control parameter  to 0.01
and the iteration number to 5. For the optimization-based
approach, we set the learning rate of Adam optimizer to
0.005 and the maximum iteration number to 100 to force the
algorithm to stop when it cannot find the optimal solution
in reasonable time. For the universal adversarial perturbation
attack, we keep the same setting with the optimization-based
approach. For AdvGAN, we set the learning rate of Adam
optimizer of the discriminator and the generator to 0.001.
We clip the value of perturbation in the range [-0.3, 0.3].
We set α as 1. For adversarial training, we set α as 0.5.
For defensive distillation, we vary λ as 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5,
1, 5, 10 respectively to train 7 different distillation models
and experiment with their performance. All hyper-parameter
settings either use the default ones or the same values from
prior work. For feature squeezing, we implement 4-bit image
depth reduction and 2 × 2 median smoothing because they
perform best as shown in [44]. We vary the threshold as
0.01, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.15 to explore performances of feature
squeezing under different settings.
We conduct experiments under white-box and black-box
settings. Under white-box setting, all five attacks have full
knowledge of a driving model so they could directly generate
adversarial examples by malware. Under black-box setting,
attakers are assumed to train a proxy driving model offline. For
universal perturbation attacks and AdvGAN universal adver-
sarial perturbation attacks, attackers could construct universal
perturbations based on a proxy driving model. For AdvGAN
attack, the AdvGAN model could also be trained on the proxy
model. Then universal perturbations and AdvGAN could be
integrated into a malware to conduct black-box attacks. Other
two attacks are not available under the black-box setting as
they need information about the driving model in real-time to
construct adversarial examples. Therefore, we only evaluate
Universal perturbation attack, AdvGAN attack and AdvGAN
universal perturbation attack in black-box attack experiments.
We use a common metric, attack success rate, to measure the
performance of adversarial attacks and defenses. An attack is
considered successful, if the steer angle deviation is greater
than the adversarial threshold ∆ = 0.3. An attack success
rate is computed as the portion of the number of adversarial
examples that the attack is successful out of all generated
adversarial examples. All experiments are conducted in a
simulation environment with Intel i7-8700 3.2GHz, 32GB of
memory, and a NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti GPU.
A. Research Questions
We investigate the following research questions:
• RQ1: In the white-box setting, how does each of the five
attacks perform on different driving models?
• RQ2: Do those attacks still perform well in the black-box
setting?
• RQ3: Do adversarial defense methods improve the ro-
bustness of driving models against adversarial attacks?
V. RESULT
This section presents experiment results of five attacks and
three defenses on three driving models.
A. RQ1. Effectiveness of White-box Attacks
Table II shows the attack success rate of applying five
attacks on three selected driving models. All attack methods
except IT-FGSM achieve high attack success rate on all three
models. The highest attack success rate of IT-FGSM is 59.2%
Fig. 2. Attack Success Rate with Different Threshold ∆
Fig. 3. Display of steering angle track on the driving scene image. The blue,
red, yellow and green lines are the tracks with 0, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 steering
angle deviations respectively. When setting the deviation to 0.3, the vehicle
clearly turns to a wrong direction.
on Epoch model but other methods can achieve over 90% on
all three models. Opt uni and AdvGAN even achieve 100% on
Epoch model and average over 99% on the other two models.
The reason is that IT-FGSM only perturbs pixels in an image
by simply adding the sign of gradients, while Opt and Opt uni
utilize Adam optimizer to search adversarial perturbations in
multiple iterations. AdvGAN and AdvGAN uni learn intrinsic
features (e.g., yellow road lanes) that influence steer angle
predictions to generate adversarial perturbations. IT-FGSM has
the lowest attack success rate on VGG16, implying that the
TABLE II
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE OF FIVE ATTACKS ON THREE DRIVING MODELS
Epoch Nvidia VGG16
IT-FGSM 59.2% 31.8% 16.2%
Opt 91.2% 99.3% 95.8%
Opt uni 100% 99.9% 99.9%
AdvGAN 100% 99.5% 98.0%
AdvGAN uni 99.8% 96.4% 96.3%
Fig. 4. The comparison of five adversarial attacks on a road image. The top row shows the adversarial images generated by five attacks (from left to right:
IT-FGSM, Opt, Opt uni, AdvGAN, AdvGAN uni), as well as the steer angle predictions of the Epoch model on the original image (green line, value is
-0.0423) and on the adversarial image (red line, values are 0.0308, 0.2665, 0.6737, 0.3649 and 0.4658 respectively). The bottom row shows the perturbation
of each attack amplified by five times.
driving model with a more complicated structure is robust to
simple adversarial attacks. However, for other attacks, attack
success rates are fairly high on three models. The result
indicates that autonomous driving models are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks.
Figure 4 illustrates steer angle deviations predicted by
Epoch. Under different kinds of attacks (the top row), as well
as corresponding adversarial perturbations generated on the
same driving scene (the bottom row). IT-FGSM causes only
a slight steer angle deviation (0.0731 only) even though this
attack adds a perturbation with a big distortion, while other
attacks cause much larger deviations close to or above the
adversarial threshold (0.3). The amplified perturbations gener-
ated by AdvGAN and AdvGAN Uni resemble the yellow lane
and the white lane in the original image, implying that these
GAN-based attacks have learned that road lanes are important
features to affect the steer angle prediction.
In summary, adversarial attacks are achievable and danger-
ous on autonomous driving. Optimization-based attacks (Opt,
Opt uni) and Generative-network based attacks (AdvGAN,
AdvGAN uni) could generate adversarial examples to achieve
high attack success rate under white-box setting. Among all
the attacks, AdvGAN seems to be the most dangerous attack
as it exploits intrinsic features learned by driving models.
Result 1: Regression driving models are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks as IT-FGSM, Opt, Opt uni, AdvGAN,
and AdvGAN uni all achieve high attack success rates.
B. RQ2. Effectiveness of Black-box Attacks
To investigate the effectiveness of different adversarial at-
tacks in the black-box setting, we first generate adversarial
TABLE III
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE UNDER BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
Epoch Nvidia VGG16
Epoch
Opt uni - 5.4% 0.5%
AdvGAN - 0.1% 0.2%
AdvGAN uni - 3.7% 0.7%
Nvidia
Opt uni 9.8% - 2.6%
AdvGAN 2.5% - 0.4%
AdvGAN uni 6.4% - 8.4%
VGG16
Opt uni 3.9% 30.0% -
AdvGAN 0.6% 0.1% -
AdvGAN uni 1.3% 1.7% -
examples on each model and then reuse these examples to
attack the other models.
Table III shows the attack success rate when reusing ad-
versarial examples across models. Overall, the attack success
rate of Opt uni, AdvGAN, AdvGAN uni drops significantly
in the black-box setting, compared within the white-box set-
ting. Opt Uni is relatively more effective than other attacks
in the black-box setting. For instance, adversarial examples
generated by Opt Uni on VGG16 achieves 30.0% success rate
on the Nvidia model. The reason may be that perturbations
generated by Opt Uni lead to bigger image distortions than
other attacks, which have higher chances to cause prediction
deviation in the black-box setting. However, adversarial per-
turbations generated by other attacks are specialized towards
individual models and thus lose the advantages when reused
across models.
Furthermore, adversarial examples generated on the most
complicated driving model VGG16 have better transferability
than those on the other two simpler models. For instance,
adversarial examples generated by Opt uni on VGG16 could
TABLE IV
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE WITH ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Model Data Augmentation RMSE
Attack Success Rate
IT-FGSM Opt Opt Uni AdvGAN AdvGAN uni
Epoch
— 0.0962 59.2% 91.2% 99.9% 99.5% 99.8%
IT-FGSM 0.0889 39.3% 95.2% 100% 99.9% 99.2%
Opt 0.1029 53.2% 90.3% 100% 99.9% 99.1%
Opt Uni 0.0953 47.3% 94.8% 100% 100% 99.6%
AdvGAN 0.1014 52.2% 96.8% 100% 99.8% 99.2%
AdvGAN uni 0.0888 48.4% 96.3% 100% 99.9% 99.3%
Nvidia
— 0.1055 31.8% 99.3% 99.9% 99.5% 96.4%
IT-FGSM 0.1119 12.0% 98.8% 100% 99.7% 94.7%
Opt 0.1119 16.0% 90.3% 100% 99.7% 96.3%
Opt Uni 0.1144 11.2% 92.1% 100% 99.7% 94.0%
AdvGAN 0.1118 15.0% 99.6% 100% 99.8% 93.5%
AdvGAN uni 0.1162 13.3% 92.3% 100% 99.8% 89.5%
VGG16
— 0.0906 16.2% 95.8% 99.9% 98.0% 96.3%
IT-FGSM 0.0889 5.8% 99.1% 99.9% 99.0% 97.3%
Opt 0.0893 7.3% 100% 100% 99.0% 96.8%
Opt Uni 0.0875 6.1% 98.7% 100% 98.8% 97.2%
AdvGAN 0.0788 3.1% 96.8% 100% 99.8% 99.2%
AdvGAN uni 0.0922 4.5% 99.2% 100% 98.3% 91.8 %
achieve a 30.0% attack success rate on Nvidia while ad-
versarial examples generated by the same attack on Epoch
could only achieve 5.4% success rate. VGG16 is also more
robust against black-box attacks than the other two models.
For example, adversarial examples generated on the Nvidia
model by Opt uni achieve a 9.8% attack success rate on Epoch
while only 2.6% on VGG16. These results indicate that the
transferability of adversarial examples may relate to intrinsic
properties of driving models such as the complexity of network
architecture, which should be verified in further research.
Prior works show that adversarial examples generated on a
classification model could be used to successfully attack other
models with different architectures for the same task [22],
[28], [29]. However, our experiment is inconsistent with those
previous findings of the transferability of adversarial attacks
on classification models. It implies that adversarial attacks
may have different attributes on regression models. In [7],
authors propose a new explanation for transferability. They
find out that for the same classification task, the models
with different architecture would learn a similar function and
decision boundary so that the adversarial examples generated
on one model could attack the others. For regression models,
the conflicting result from the above findings may suggest that
different regression models fit in different hyper-planes so that
the adversarial examples generated on one model cannot be
transferred to attack other models.
Result 2: Attacks under black-box setting do not perform
well on autonomous driving models. The result demon-
strates that the transferability of adversarial examples for
Fig. 5. Attack Success Rate with Defensive Distillation
driving models is not good, which contradicts previous
experiment results on classification models.
C. RQ3. Effectiveness of Adversarial Defenses
Table IV shows the attack success rate of each attack
method when defended by adversarial training. Figure 5 shows
the defense result of defensive distillation. For adversarial
training, each driving model is re-trained on five new datasets
augmented with adversarial examples generated by one of
TABLE V
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK OVERHEAD ON DRIVING MODELS
Prediction Time
Overhead (s)
GPU Memory
Overhead (%)
GPU Utilization
Overhead (%)
Epoch
IT-FGSM 0.04243 50.62 36
Opt 0.10490 50.91 32
Opt uni -0.00007 0.38 1
AdvGAN 0.00532 4.01 1
AdvGAN uni -0.00013 0.19 1
Nvidia
IT-FGSM 0.06159 11.73 17
Opt 0.10455 9.63 19
Opt uni 0.00005 1.73 1
AdvGAN 0.00568 3.09 1
AdvGAN uni -0.00007 2.10 1
VGG16
IT-FGSM 0.06159 9.66 35
Opt 0.24364 18.13 35
Opt uni 0.00005 0.31 1
AdvGAN 0.00568 0.75 1
AdvGAN uni -0.00007 0.44 1
Fig. 6. Detection rate of Feature Squeezing
the five attacks. For defensive distillation, We distill seven
new models using different temperature values λ. The original
model is denoted by λ = 0. We find that both defense methods
are to some extent effective to IT-FGSM. For example, when
defending the Epoch model, adversarial training reduces the
success rate of IT-FGSM from 59.2% to 39.3%, while defense
distillation reduces it from 60% to near 10% when setting λ to
0.1. Besides, defensive distillation is also effective in reducing
the attack success rate of Opt. However, two defenses are
not effective to defend other attacks. In particular, defensive
distillation essentially smooths the change of gradients in a
neural network model to reduce the influence of adversarial
perturbations. This explains why it could work on IT-FGSM
and Opt but is not effective in other attacks like AdvGAN,
which generates adversarial perturbations by learning impor-
tant features that may affect prediction results.
Table V shows the prediction time overhead (delay), GPU
memory overhead, and GPU utilization overhead induced by
different adversarial attacks. Only IT-FGSM and Opt induces
some latency, while other methods induce negligible delays.
Regarding GPU memory usage, both IT-FGSM and Opt cause
over 50% overhead when attacking Epoch. The memory usage
overhead is relatively lower but still significant (around 10%)
when attacking Nvidia and VGG16. Regarding the GPU
utilization rate, both IT-FGSM and Opt cause an average
of 35% overhead on Epoch and VGG16 and about 19% on
Nvidia. We only observe 1% overhead when running the other
three attacks. Overall, IT-FGSM and Opt attacks are more
likely to be detected because both of them require a few
iterations to compute gradients for each input image, which
leads to computation overhead. Adv GAN only increases GPU
utilization by 1% but increases the memory usage by 4%
for a relatively small model like Epoch. Since Opt uni Ad-
vGAN uni apply a universal perturbation on each image, they
barely cause overhead. Therefore, Opt uni and AdvGAN uni
are less likely to be detected by runtime monitoring utilities
adopted by automotive industry.
Figure 6 presents the defense effect of feature squeezing.
The Original (False) line denotes the false detection rate on
the original dataset without attack. The other five lines denote
the detection rates of adversarial examples for the driving
model. When the threshold is set to 0.01, feature squeezing
can almost detect all adversarial attacks on three models.
However, it leads to many false positives (40%), which is not
realistic to be deployed in practice. When the threshold is set
above 0.05, the effectiveness of feature squeezing decreases
significantly. Overall, 0.05 is empirically the best threshold,
with 78% attack detection rate and only 5% false positives.
We also notice when the threshold is larger than 0.01, the
detection rates on VGG16 are lower and decrease faster
compared with Epoch and Nvidia. The result suggests that
adversarial examples generated on VGG16 are more resistant
to feature squeezing. This is also consistent with our previous
finding that adversarial examples generated on more complex
regression models are more dangerous.
Result 3: Adversarial training and defensive distillation
are effective against IT-FGSM and the optimization based
attack to some extent, but no other attacks. Anomaly
detection and feature squeezing mechanisms, on the other
hand, are able to detect more adversarial attacks but with
their own shortcomings.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Implications
Implication 1. It is important to apply multiple defense
methods in combination. We find that no single defense
method can effectively protect driving models from all of
five attack methods we investigated. Though feature squeezing
has relatively high attack detection rate for all attacks, it
has mistakenly detected normal input images as adversarial
examples with up to 40% false positive rate. Thus, these
defense methods should be combined to provide a more robust
defense against various attacks. For some detection methods
that require higher computational resources, these techniques
might not be fit to be implemented on the vehicle’s side.
In such a case, we can leverage edge computing for faster
response and implement adversarial detection middleware for
autonomous driving on edge nodes to enhance autonomous
driving vehicle safety.
Implication 2. Further investigation is needed to explore the
impact of different DNN structures of regression models on
their vulnerability. We find that VGG16 is less vulnerable
than the other two models in both the white-box and black-
box settings. One possible reason is that VGG16 has more
complicated model structure than the other two models, which
makes it harder to attack. Therefore, it may be more secure
to deploy models with complex structures. However, since
autonomous vehicles cannot carry super complicated driving
models due to limited computation power, we should explore
how to design a model with a proper structure complexity
while consuming minimal computation power. One promising
direction is to adopt edging computing architecture [20] to
deploy such complex driving models. Complex models can
be segmented and distributed to end nodes (vehicles), edge
nodes (roadside units) and cloud [9] to reduce the resource
consumption to vehicles.
Implication 3. It is important to protect the detail of driving
models and exploring the transferability of adversarial
examples on driving models is needed. The experiment result
of the white-box attack (RQ1) shows that attacks achieve high
attack success rates on driving models, which means once the
details of driving models are known by attackers, they could
easily implement effective adversarial attacks. Therefore, it
is important to hide the neural network structure details and
hyper-parameters of driving models. On the other hand, recent
research shows that deep learning models are susceptible to
information extraction [25], [38] and the extracted information
can beused to construct attacks. Therefore, it is also important
to research techniques like [14] to protect deep learning mod-
els against model extraction. The experiment result of black-
box attack (RQ2) shows that adversarial examples generated
on a driving model do not have good attack transferability on
other driving models. This finding contradicts with existing
findings of attack transferability on classification models [22],
[28], [29]. Since driving models are essentially regression
models, this suggests further analysis to investigate the root
cause of transferability differences between classification mod-
els and regression models. In V-B, we hypothesize that differ-
ent regression models may learn different hyper-planes to fit
data. This hypothesis needs to be evaluated in future work.
Future research of transferability of driving models attack
will provide more insights about how to construct and defend
black-box attacks on driving models.
B. Limitations
This work assumes attackers could intrude an autonomous
driving system to inject malware when an autonomous vehicle
is connected to the Internet and upgrades its software and
firmware over the air (OTA) [26]. Then attackers could use
the malware to intercept images and construct adversarial
examples before the images are fed into the perception layer.
Unlike the direct interference to vehicle devices, which could
be detected and prohibited by the autonomous driving system
and human drivers, adversarial examples are imperceptible to
human eyes and thus cannot be easily identified by drivers
from the infotainment system in a car. Therefore, when an
attacker intrudes a driving system, an simple attack like replac-
ing driving scenes with arbitrary images will be detected easily
while adversarial attacks cannot be detected by infotainment
system.
This work only experimented with three CNN based driving
models. We did not select the top 3 driving models on the
Udacity leaderboard, since all of them take driving videos
as input and use sequence-to-sequence structures that existing
attack and defense methods are not applicable to. Furthermore,
we have not experimented with driving models with more
complicated architectures such as CNN+RNN. Similar to prior
work [37], [47], our experiments are only conducted on the
Udacity dataset. Validating our findings with more driving
models and datasets remains as future work.
CleverHans [27], and Foolbox [33] are two common open
source tools to perform adversarial attacks and defenses.
However, these three tools all focus on classification models.
Investigating how to adapt those tools to handle regression
models that predicate steering angles remains as future work.
In [10], an optimization-based approach is proposed to
bypass feature squeezing but this approach needs to consume
much more time. On the MNIST dataset, this approach spends
20−30 seconds for generating one valid adversarial example.
This time consumption overhead is unrealistic for attacking
driving models in real-time so we choose not to implement
this approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of adversarial
attacks and defenses on autonomous driving models. To that
end, we implemented five adversarial attacks and four defen-
sive techniques on three CNN based driving models. From
experiment results, all of these three driving models are not
robust against these adversarial attacks apart from IT-FGSM,
while none of four defensive techniques can defend all of five
adversarial attacks. We also raise several insights for future
research including building middleware that leverages multiple
defense methods in tandem, leveraging distributed complex
regression driving models, and techniques to defend model
information extraction.
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